Redefining Information Operations by Colonel Carmine Cicalese

Abstract

Joint information operations (IO) is advancing, and tomorrow’s military operations will call for professionals who understand the past IO environment and can thus press the potentialities of the future. IO must be adapted to circumstances, yet it must also be planned and executed within its doctrinal definition, which again requires a thoughtful breed of information warrior. Informing all audiences will remain a growth industry for some time, necessitating a cadre that can comfortably operate in and shape the information environment, in the process providing commanders with expanded options and reducing staff tensions.

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Terrorism Online: The Web’s Role in Radicalization by Chandler Karadsheh from www.oodaloop.com

Old-fashioned paper propaganda is getting phased out. Taking its place is social media, a relative newcomer that is taking the world by storm. Social media’s open, web-based interactive formats allow for instant communication to an unlimited audience. The use of social media has dramatically risen in the last decade, especially among young adults. The monumental popularity and outreach capabilities of social media have made this sector a prime target for terrorist recruitment operations. Social media offers several huge advantages to terrorist groups. The Internet is easily accessible with cheap equipment and offers world-wide reach in an instant. Given the ease of incorporating these innovations, terrorist recruitment efforts have increasingly turned to social media for organization, outreach and propagandizing. Read full article…..Here

Director of the Joint Staff Signs New Joint IO Doctrine

JP 3-13, Information OperationsOn 27 November, the director of the Joint Staff signed the new Joint Pub 3-13, Information Operations (IO). This publication provides the joint community with information operations doctrine and how to accomplish IO planning to employ these forces. This is the first substantive update to overall IO joint doctrine since February, 2006. Following lists the summary of changes since the previously published doctrine. The most substantive change is in the definition of IO, which this doctrine encapsulates and expands on to ensure IO planning is used according to this definition.

· Identifies the information environment as the aggregate of individuals, organizations, and systems that collect, process, disseminate or act on information.

· Defines information-related capabilities (IRCs) as tools, techniques or activities employed within a dimension of the information environment, which can be used to achieve a specific end(s).

· Introduces the information-influence relational framework as a model illustrating the use of means and ways, through the applications of IRCs, to achieve an end(s) through influence of a target audience (TA).

· Defines TA as an individual or group selected for influence.

· Describes information operations (IO) as the integrated employment, during military operations, of IRCs in concert with other lines of operation, to influence, disrupt, corrupt, or usurp the decision making of adversaries and potential adversaries while protecting our own.

· Designates the IO staff as the combatant command focal point for IO and the IO cell as the planning element responsible for integration and synchronization of IRCs to achieve national or combatant commander objectives against adversaries or potential adversaries.

· Emphasizes IO must be integrated into all steps of the joint operation planning process.

· Articulates that it is vital to integrate multinational partners into joint IO planning, in order to gain agreement on an integrated and achievable IO strategy.

The full JP 3-13 is located at the Joint Electronic Library in the Operations Series Section.

The Effectiveness of US Military Information Operations in Afghanistan 2001-2010: Why RAND Missed the Point

By
Major General (rtd) Andrew Mackay
Commander Steve Tatham Ph.D Royal Navy
Dr Lee Rowland: The Behavioural Dynamics Institute

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

In May 2012 the RAND Corporation published a detailed study of Click on Photo to Read the Rand Study on IO/MISO/PsyOps in Afghanistanthe effectiveness of US Information Operations in Afghanistan between 2001-2010 (Click on Cover to Read Full Rand Study). The paper identified six key lessons that the US must learn from that experience and made five recommendations. 

This paper finds much to agree with in RAND’s findings, but much, too, with which it disagrees, particularly in RAND’s recommendations. However, it is the view of this paper’s authors that RAND has missed THE fundamental failing in not just US IO and MISO/PsyOps but wider ISAF efforts as well: (Read the Full Essay at the Download Button).

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